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Introduction	  	  There	  was	  a	  time	  when	  philosophers	  of	  science	  treated	  science	  simply	  as	  a	  means	  of	  accumulating	  truth	  or	  at	  any	  rate	  justified	  belief.	  	  Its	  central	  question	  was	  how	  it	  achieved	  this	  excellent	  result,	  and	  what	  differentiated	  it	  from	  more	  benighted	  human	  practices	  with	  less	  respectable	  claims	  to	  knowledge—religion	  or	  philosophy,	  for	  instance.	  	  	  	  Nowadays,	  though	  most	  philosophers	  still	  see	  science	  as	  the	  pre-­‐eminent	  source	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world,	  enthusiasm	  is	  often	  more	  nuanced.	  	  	  Scepticism	  is	  common	  concerning	  the	  limits	  of	  scientific	  truth—perhaps	  there	  are	  important	  areas	  of	  human	  concern	  that	  science	  cannot	  reach,	  and	  perhaps	  there	  are	  still	  important	  things	  to	  be	  said	  for	  other	  kinds	  of	  knowledge	  or	  wisdom.	  	  A	  related	  concern	  that	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  whether	  even	  if	  science	  delivers	  truth,	  this	  is	  enough	  to	  count	  it	  as	  a	  good	  thing.	  	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  questions	  to	  which	  Philip	  Kitcher	  has	  turned	  his	  attention	  over	  the	  last	  fifteen	  years	  or	  so,	  and	  his	  path-­‐breaking	  work	  on	  this	  and	  related	  questions	  have	  helped	  to	  bring	  political	  issues	  concerning	  science	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  philosophical	  attention.	  	  A	  good	  entry	  point	  into	  the	  topic	  is	  Kitcher’s	  (2001)	  distinction	  between	  truth	  and	  significant	  truth.	  	  There	  is	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  truths:	  I	  have	  x	  hairs	  on	  my	  head,	  I	  have	  fewer	  than	  x	  +1	  hairs	  on	  my	  head,	  I	  have	  fewer	  than	  x	  +	  2	  hairs	  on	  my	  head…	  For	  some	  x	  all	  of	  these	  are	  true,	  but	  none	  is	  very	  significant.	  	  And	  of	  course	  there	  are	  many	  facts	  that	  have	  much	  greater	  significance	  than	  this	  for	  some—my	  childrens’	  birthdays,	  say,	  are	  important	  facts	  for	  me—that	  are	  of	  very	  little	  interest	  to	  science.	  There	  is	  surely	  not	  time	  enough	  for	  science	  to	  enumerate	  all	  the	  truths	  there	  are,	  and	  even	  if	  there	  were	  there	  are	  some	  that	  we	  would	  very	  much	  like	  to	  know	  sooner	  rather	  than	  later.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  are	  among	  the	  significant	  truths.	  	  How	  do	  we	  decide	  which	  these	  are,	  and	  thus	  direct	  our	  finite	  scientific	  effort	  to	  finding	  out	  the	  things	  that	  we	  have	  some	  reason	  to	  want	  to	  know?	  	  This	  question	  perhaps	  seemed	  less	  pressing	  when	  many	  philosophers	  believed	  that	  science	  was	  a	  unified	  whole.	  	  This	  belief	  was	  often	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  ‘layer-­‐cake’	  model,	  in	  which	  sciences	  were	  ordered	  in	  a	  hierarchy	  in	  which	  physics	  was	  the	  most	  fundamental,	  chemistry	  was	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  physics,	  biology	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  chemistry,	  and	  so	  on	  through	  psychology,	  sociology	  and	  so	  on.	  	  The	  most	  significant	  truths	  were	  fairly	  obviously	  the	  laws	  that	  articulated	  this	  hierarchical	  structure,	  and	  the	  more	  fundamental,	  i.e.	  the	  nearer	  to	  physics,	  the	  more	  significant.	  	  Also	  highly	  significant	  were	  the	  descriptions,	  for	  example	  of	  chemical	  entities	  in	  terms	  of	  physical	  constituents	  and	  their	  relations,	  which	  made	  possible	  the	  derivations	  from	  more	  to	  less	  fundamental	  levels.	  	  	  
	   2	  
	  I	  think	  this	  view	  of	  a	  unified	  science	  is	  no	  longer	  defensible	  (Dupré	  1993,	  Cartwright	  1999),	  a	  position	  that	  is	  also	  central	  to	  Kitcher’s	  recent	  work.	  Kitcher	  belongs	  to	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  philosophers	  of	  science	  who	  see	  science	  as	  pluralistic,	  as	  consisting	  of	  particular	  theories	  or	  models	  designed	  to	  address	  particular	  classes	  of	  question.	  	  Scientific	  models	  abstract	  from	  the	  complexity	  of	  nature	  and	  aim	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  relatively	  small	  set	  of	  properties	  that	  are	  more	  or	  less	  decisive	  in	  generating	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  phenomenon.	  	  Unlike	  the	  unified	  picture,	  pluralism	  offers	  no	  internal	  account	  of	  which	  truths	  are	  significant;	  this	  is	  something	  that	  must	  be	  decided	  by	  some	  parallel	  process.	  	  Moreover,	  for	  a	  pluralist	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  suppose	  there	  is	  any	  limit	  to	  the	  possible	  topics	  that	  might	  be	  pursued	  scienctifically.	  	  New	  interests	  will	  make	  possible	  new	  sciences,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  anticipate	  any	  limit	  to	  the	  interests	  we	  might	  acquire.	  	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  sciences	  we	  have	  allow	  only	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  truths	  to	  be	  discovered.	  	  So	  deciding	  what	  questions	  to	  address	  becomes	  an	  unavoidable	  part	  of	  the	  scientific	  process,	  and	  how	  these	  decisions	  are	  to	  be	  made	  is	  something	  on	  which	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  had	  little	  to	  say.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  science	  is	  a	  public	  enterprise,	  funded	  by	  the	  public	  for	  the	  general	  good,	  this	  must	  be	  a	  political	  problem.	  	  Hence,	  Kitcher	  argues,	  we	  need	  a	  political	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  	  	  	  
Well-­‐Ordered	  Science	  	  Well-­‐ordered	  science	  is	  the	  concept	  Kitcher	  (2001)	  introduced	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  way	  that	  institutions	  for	  the	  collection	  and	  storage	  of	  knowledge	  should	  fit	  into	  the	  organisation	  of	  a	  democratic	  society.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  questions	  already	  mentioned	  about	  what	  scientific	  research	  should	  be	  supported,	  this	  includes	  questions	  about	  certification—when	  a	  scientific	  claim	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  have	  been	  established—and	  access—who	  should	  have	  access	  to	  what	  parts	  of	  the	  accumulated,	  certified	  scientific	  knowledge	  within	  the	  state.	  	  And,	  especially	  important,	  how	  should	  scientific	  knowledge	  be	  applied	  to	  making	  decisions	  of	  policy?	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  current	  democratic	  states	  have	  yet	  to	  achieve	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  science.	  	  At	  least,	  it	  seems	  evident	  that	  neither	  individuals	  nor	  states	  reliably	  act	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  seem	  clearly	  mandated	  by	  sound	  scientific	  knowledge.	  	  Children	  die	  from	  measles	  because	  one	  thoroughly	  discredited	  scientific	  paper	  has	  persuaded	  millions	  that	  a	  safe	  and	  effective	  vaccine	  causes	  autism;	  in	  the	  most	  affluent	  nation	  on	  earth	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  reject	  overwhelming	  evidence	  that	  we	  evolved	  over	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  years	  from	  simpler	  organisms	  through	  natural	  processes,	  and	  believe	  that	  our	  existence	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  reflection	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  an	  all-­‐powerful	  supernatural	  being.1	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  According	  to	  a	  recent	  survey	  by	  the	  Pew	  Research	  Centre,	  60%	  of	  Americans	  believed	  that	  humans	  have	  evolved	  over	  time,	  as	  opposed	  to	  having	  existed	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  time	  in	  their	  present	  state.	  	  However,	  only	  32%	  of	  Americans	  believed	  that	  this	  had	  happened	  through	  natural	  processes	  rather	  than	  as	  part	  of	  God’s	  means	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  humans	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And	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  allocation	  of	  scientific	  effort	  is	  optimal.	  	  Vast	  resources	  are	  devoted	  to	  amelioration	  or	  cure	  of	  the	  diseases	  that	  afflict	  the	  old	  in	  the	  richest	  countries,	  while	  little	  research	  is	  done	  on	  possibly	  quite	  simple	  measures	  that	  might	  massively	  reduce	  the	  devastating	  impact	  of	  infectious	  diseases,	  generally	  on	  the	  young,	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  	  And	  finally,	  even	  where	  scientific	  knowledge	  has	  been	  acquired	  with	  obvious	  political	  implications,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  appropriately	  applied.	  An	  overwhelming	  scientific	  consensus	  predicts	  catastrophic	  climatic	  changes	  resulting	  from	  carbon	  emissions,	  yet	  little	  is	  done	  to	  reverse	  this	  disastrous	  process.	  	  Kicther’s	  Science,	  Truth	  and	  Democracy	  and	  Science	  in	  a	  Democratic	  Society	  (2001;	  2011a)	  represent	  a	  systematic	  attempt	  to	  address	  these	  vital	  issues.	  	  Here	  I	  shall	  focus	  especially	  on	  two	  of	  the	  central	  issues:	  how	  is	  it	  to	  be	  decided	  what	  scientific	  research	  should	  be	  undertaken,	  and	  how	  should	  democratic	  decisions	  be	  made	  about	  the	  application	  of	  science	  to	  public	  policy?	  	  
Ill-­‐Ordered	  Science:	  What	  is	  to	  be	  done?	  	  	  	  What	  scientific	  research	  should	  be	  undertaken?	  	  A	  view	  that	  is	  probably	  held	  by	  many	  scientists	  is	  that	  this	  is	  something	  that	  they	  are	  best	  able	  to	  decide,	  and	  the	  ideal	  situation	  would	  be	  for	  all	  scientists	  to	  be	  free	  to	  address	  whatever	  questions	  they	  considered	  important	  and	  perhaps	  tractable.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  is	  right,	  and	  I	  shall	  say	  a	  bit	  more	  about	  it	  below,	  it	  is	  pretty	  clearly	  not	  very	  relevant.	  	  In	  a	  world	  of	  finite	  resources	  in	  which	  much	  of	  science	  is	  paid	  for	  by	  states,	  public	  decisions	  will	  need	  to	  be	  made	  about	  which	  projects	  are	  funded.	  	  How	  should	  this	  be	  done?	  	  A	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  naïve	  first	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  decisions	  be	  made	  by	  the	  community	  of	  scientists.	  	  In	  fact	  this	  seems	  close	  to	  what	  happens	  in	  practice	  in	  most	  democratic	  states.	  	  Scientists	  send	  proposals	  for	  research	  projects	  to	  funding	  agencies,	  and	  peers	  evaluate	  them	  and	  decide	  which	  should	  be	  supported.	  	  Unfortunately	  this	  just	  moves	  the	  problem	  up	  a	  level,	  to	  communities	  of	  scientists.	  	  If	  someone	  submits	  a	  proposal	  for	  funding	  on	  the	  mating	  behaviour	  of	  the	  Spangled	  Drongo,	  it	  will	  be	  assessed,	  if	  not	  by	  experts	  on	  the	  Spangled	  Drongo,	  at	  least	  by	  experts	  on	  bird	  behaviour	  or	  perhaps	  just	  animal	  behaviour.	  	  	  These	  experts	  may	  decide	  the	  project	  is	  less	  worthy	  than	  one	  on,	  say,	  foraging	  behaviour	  among	  wombats.	  	  But	  they	  are	  unlikely	  to	  decide	  that	  less	  or	  no	  funding	  should	  be	  allocated	  to	  any	  study	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  wild	  animals,	  a	  decision	  requiring	  an	  implausible	  kind	  of	  professional	  suicide.	  	  Whether	  limited	  resources	  are	  better	  devoted	  to	  animal	  behaviour	  or	  inorganic	  chemistry,	  say,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  something	  for	  which	  any	  particular	  kind	  of	  scientist	  has	  particular	  expertise.	  	  Kitcher,	  in	  fact,	  argues	  that	  some	  scientific	  projects	  are	  better	  not	  done	  at	  all,	  and	  certainly	  should	  not	  be	  publicly	  funded.	  	  The	  example	  that	  he	  considers	  in	  detail	  in	  Science,	  Truth	  and	  Democracy	  is	  that	  of	  racial	  science,	  the	  exploration	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (http://www.pewforum.org/2013/12/30/publics-­‐views-­‐on-­‐human-­‐evolution/;	  accessed	  17	  May,	  2014).	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differences	  between	  people	  of	  different	  races.	  	  He	  discusses	  The	  Bell	  Curve,	  the	  notorious	  book	  by	  Richard	  Herrnstein	  and	  Charles	  Murray	  in	  which	  they	  argue,	  first,	  that	  economic	  class	  generally	  reflects	  talent:	  people	  are	  poor	  because	  they	  are	  relatively	  	  dumb;	  and,	  most	  notoriously,	  that	  the	  great	  over-­‐representation	  among	  the	  poor	  of	  African-­‐Americans	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  African-­‐Americans	  are	  on	  average	  less	  intelligent	  than	  Americans	  of	  European	  descent.	  	  Suppose	  this	  is	  true?	  	  What	  would	  be	  the	  benefits	  of	  knowing	  it?	  	  As	  Kitcher	  argues,	  there	  are	  few	  obvious	  benefits	  and	  some	  obvious	  harms.	  	  Centrally,	  the	  position	  of	  a	  widely	  disadvantaged	  group	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  substantially	  worsened	  as	  those	  who	  have	  continued	  a	  centuries	  old	  tradition	  of	  discrimination	  against	  African-­‐Americans,	  for	  example	  in	  employment,	  feel	  justified	  in	  their	  discrimination	  and	  are	  (even)	  less	  motivated	  to	  end	  the	  practice.	  	  Worsening	  the	  position	  of	  the	  already	  badly	  off	  is	  widely	  agreed	  to	  be	  a	  very	  bad	  thing.	  	  There	  will	  no	  doubt	  be	  many	  who	  will	  respond	  to	  this	  argument	  by	  insisting	  that	  we	  should	  want	  the	  truth	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  may	  hurt.	  	  And,	  after	  all,	  the	  discovery	  claimed	  by	  Herrnstein	  and	  Murray	  really	  may	  show	  that	  alleged	  discrimination	  in	  employment	  isn’t	  what	  it	  seems.	  	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  just	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  systematically	  lower	  qualifications	  of	  African-­‐Americans.	  	  Just	  as	  women	  are	  (appropriately	  it	  may	  well	  be	  claimed)	  under-­‐represented	  in	  occupations	  requiring	  upper	  body	  strength,	  so	  African-­‐Americans	  are	  appropriately	  under-­‐represented	  in	  jobs	  that	  require	  exceptional	  intelligence.	  	  At	  this	  point	  we	  need	  to	  be	  a	  little	  more	  critical	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  research	  in	  question	  is	  likely	  to	  generate	  truth.	  	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  research	  of	  this	  kind	  assumes	  that	  there	  is	  something	  being	  measured,	  intelligence,	  that	  is	  somehow	  a	  purely	  biological	  property,	  independent	  of	  upbringing	  and	  education.	  	  This	  is	  highly	  contentious.	  	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  recognise	  that	  measured	  intelligence	  reflects	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  developmental	  process	  influenced	  at	  least	  as	  much	  by	  education	  as	  by	  any	  natural	  endowment,	  then	  we	  see	  that	  the	  outcomes	  of	  intelligence	  tests	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  symptom	  of	  inequality	  rather	  than	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  cause	  of	  inequality.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  misinterpretation,	  if	  taken	  seriously,	  is	  likely	  to	  justify	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  unequal	  treatment	  that	  in	  fact	  causes	  the	  perceived	  differences.	  	  Thus	  this	  research	  may	  not	  only	  be	  taken	  to	  justify	  unequal	  treatment,	  but	  it	  may	  help	  to	  perpetuate	  the	  phenomena	  that	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  misguided	  interpretation.	  	  It	  is,	  in	  addition,	  highly	  debatable	  whether	  a	  further	  premise	  of	  the	  most	  notorious	  aspect	  of	  the	  research	  in	  question	  is	  justified,	  namely	  that	  there	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  people—Americans	  of	  African	  descent,	  and	  Americans	  of	  European	  descent—that	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  differ	  systematically	  in	  their	  properties.	  	  As	  is	  well-­‐known,	  genetic	  diversity	  is	  much	  greater	  within	  standardly	  distinguished	  racial	  groups	  than	  between	  groups,	  and	  given	  the	  extent	  of	  human	  interbreeding	  it	  is	  difficult	  or	  impossible	  to	  provide	  sharp	  definitions	  of	  who	  belongs	  to	  which	  group.	  	  Hence	  we	  find	  such	  bizarre	  conventions	  as	  the	  ‘one	  drop	  of	  blood’	  rule	  that	  defined	  anyone	  with	  detectable	  African	  ancestry	  as	  black.	  	  There	  is	  at	  least	  serious	  debate	  about	  whether	  racial	  categories	  have	  any	  ontological	  validity.	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These	  concerns	  about	  the	  categories	  in	  which	  this	  research	  is	  framed	  raise	  a	  further	  concern.	  	  Quite	  apart	  from	  ethical	  questions	  about	  undertaking	  the	  research	  in	  question,	  values	  are	  in	  fact	  already	  embedded	  in	  these	  categories.	  	  Consider	  intelligence.	  	  Typical	  intelligence	  tests	  address	  various	  competencies,	  for	  example	  ability	  to	  handle	  and	  manipulate	  numbers,	  to	  visualise	  the	  relationships	  between	  shapes,	  or	  to	  deploy	  vocabulary	  effectively.	  	  Why	  these,	  rather	  than,	  say,	  the	  ability	  to	  recognise	  the	  makes	  of	  cars	  or	  to	  play	  fast	  reaction	  video	  games?	  	  If	  such	  tests	  are	  not,	  as	  is	  often	  said,	  merely	  a	  measure	  of	  peoples’	  abilities	  to	  do	  intelligence	  tests,	  it	  must	  be	  supposed	  that	  they	  are	  correlated	  with	  other	  skills,	  perhaps	  those	  supposed	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  succeeding	  in	  human	  life.	  Such	  correlations	  could	  no	  doubt	  be	  investigated.	  	  But	  what	  is	  success	  here?	  	  Clearly	  at	  some	  point	  this	  is	  going	  to	  require	  a	  normative	  decision.	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  of	  objectivity:	  there	  could	  be	  a	  perfectly	  objective	  measure	  of	  the	  abilities	  to	  recognise	  cars	  or	  shoot	  down	  virtual	  vampires.	  	  We	  choose	  to	  measure	  intelligence	  because	  we	  value	  outcomes	  that	  this	  supposed	  capacity	  helps	  us	  to	  achieve.	  	  	  Similar	  issues	  arise	  even	  more	  obviously	  for	  racial	  categories.	  	  There	  is	  nothing	  ontologically	  defective	  with	  the	  category	  of	  people	  with	  at	  least	  one	  drop	  of	  African	  blood	  (or,	  let	  us	  say,	  one	  ancestor	  native	  to	  Africa	  within	  the	  last	  four	  hundred	  years).	  	  But	  why	  anyone	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  this	  as	  a	  category	  for	  scientific	  research	  is	  another	  matter.	  	  Only	  a	  normative	  explanation,	  whether	  based	  on	  racial	  hostility	  or	  historical	  reparation,	  seems	  possible.	  	  At	  any	  rate,	  the	  fact	  that	  social,	  political	  or	  ethical	  values	  are	  embedded	  in	  much	  research	  from	  the	  outset	  makes	  even	  more	  pressing	  questions	  about	  the	  desirability	  of	  the	  research.	  	  	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  make	  a	  detailed	  argument	  that	  research	  on	  psychological	  differences	  between	  races	  is	  epistemically	  misguided,	  though	  I	  think	  it	  is.	  	  The	  point	  is	  rather	  that	  the	  premises	  that	  underlie	  this	  research	  are	  at	  best	  controversial,	  and	  hence	  so	  are	  the	  results	  of	  the	  research.	  	  The	  combination	  of	  research	  the	  outcome	  of	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  both	  dubious	  and	  harmful	  provides	  a	  paradigm	  for	  research	  it	  would	  be	  better	  not	  to	  do.	  	  	  	  I	  don’t	  assume	  that	  both	  these	  conditions	  must	  be	  present	  to	  make	  research	  undesirable.	  	  There	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  epistemically	  sound	  research	  that	  should	  not	  be	  carried	  out	  for	  obvious	  ethical	  reasons.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  some	  Nazi	  research	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  hypothermia,	  while	  sound	  in	  principle,	  is	  so	  morally	  repugnant	  in	  its	  methods	  that	  it	  has	  been	  intensely	  debated	  whether	  it	  is	  even	  morally	  acceptable	  to	  make	  use	  of	  its	  outcomes.	  	  Perhaps	  exploding	  atomic	  bombs	  in	  earthquake	  faults	  would	  be	  a	  good	  way	  of	  learning	  about	  tectonics,	  but	  few	  people	  would	  advocate	  pursuing	  this	  line	  of	  enquiry.	  	  The	  preceding	  remarks	  illustrate	  a	  central	  theme	  in	  Kitcher’s	  work:	  the	  traditional	  idea	  of	  science	  as	  value	  free	  is	  indefensible.	  	  Values	  are	  unavoidably	  implicated	  not	  only	  in	  decisions	  about	  what	  topics	  we	  decide	  to	  investigate,	  but	  in	  the	  concepts	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  we	  formulate	  the	  questions	  we	  try	  to	  answer.	  	  These	  questions,	  in	  turn,	  cannot	  be	  answered	  apart	  from	  decisions	  about	  the	  goals	  we	  would	  like	  our	  science	  to	  serve.	  	  This	  is	  not,	  as	  is	  still	  sometimes	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supposed,	  an	  argument	  that	  science	  is	  subjective,	  or	  the	  acceptance	  of	  its	  results	  a	  matter	  of	  taste.	  It	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  we	  cannot	  understand	  science	  properly	  without	  attending	  to	  these	  fundamental	  normative	  aspects.2	  	  	  It	  is,	  at	  any	  rate,	  uncontroversial	  that	  there	  should	  be	  limits	  on	  what	  scientific	  research	  should	  be	  undertaken	  at	  all,	  let	  alone	  publicly	  funded,	  and	  Kitcher’s	  contribution	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  example	  of	  racial	  difference	  is	  valuable	  especially	  for	  exploring	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  important	  respects	  in	  which	  this	  research	  may	  be	  highly	  undesirable	  even	  if	  from	  a	  scientific	  point	  of	  view,	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  likelihood	  to	  discover	  truths,	  it	  were	  perfectly	  sound.	  	  	  	  The	  question	  then	  inevitably	  arises,	  how	  we	  should	  decide	  what	  research	  should	  be	  undertaken.	  	  Kitcher’s	  answer,	  very	  roughly	  speaking,	  is	  that	  such	  decisions	  should	  be	  made	  democratically.	  	  The	  democracy	  he	  has	  in	  mind,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  ‘vulgar’	  democracy	  of	  popular	  referenda	  but	  a	  more	  Millian	  conception	  that	  recognises	  the	  importance	  and	  value	  of	  expertise.	  	  I	  shall	  consider	  some	  aspects	  of	  this	  solution	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  Here	  I	  note	  only	  that	  Kitcher	  does	  not	  advocate	  the	  simple	  and	  obvious	  solution	  of	  banning	  research	  that	  is	  deemed	  undesirable,	  though	  presumably	  the	  processes	  that	  he	  advocates	  for	  decision-­‐making	  would	  at	  the	  least	  make	  public	  funding	  of,	  for	  example,	  the	  research	  just	  discussed	  on	  racial	  difference	  very	  unlikely.	  	  	  	  I	  will	  confess,	  in	  passing,	  that	  I	  am	  somewhat	  tempted	  to	  a	  more	  coercive	  view.	  	  Democratic	  decision-­‐making,	  vulgar	  or	  sophisticated,	  is	  likely	  mainly	  to	  affect	  questions	  of	  public	  funding.	  The	  Millian	  perspective	  that	  Kitcher	  largely	  endorses	  sets	  a	  high	  bar	  against	  limiting	  the	  intellectual	  activities	  of	  private	  individuals	  and	  this	  certainly	  applies	  to	  scientific	  inquiry.	  	  However,	  concerns	  about	  harmful	  science	  today	  apply	  not	  to	  private	  individuals	  in	  their	  garages	  or	  back	  rooms,	  but	  to	  vast	  corporations	  sometimes	  dwarfing	  nation	  states	  in	  their	  resources.	  	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  consider	  in	  detail	  whether	  such	  corporations	  are	  in	  fact	  engaged	  in	  research	  that	  violates	  the	  constraints	  of	  well-­‐ordered	  science.	  	  But	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  are,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  they	  could	  be	  restrained	  from	  doing	  so	  other	  than	  by	  banning	  relevant	  domains	  of	  enquiry.	  	  If	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  democratic	  state	  would	  decide	  that	  research	  on	  racial	  differences	  should	  not	  be	  publicly	  funded,	  I’m	  not	  sure	  why	  it	  should	  not	  prevent	  such	  research	  being	  done	  outside	  the	  confines	  of	  state	  institutions.	  	  	  	  	  Kitcher	  does	  have	  an	  argument	  for	  not	  banning	  research,	  namely	  that	  this	  may	  well	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  it	  is	  banned	  because	  if	  it	  were	  carried	  out	  it	  would	  produce	  the	  results	  which,	  it	  is	  feared,	  will	  do	  harm	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  banning	  research	  on	  racial	  difference	  may	  lead	  people	  to	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  banned	  because	  it	  is	  supposed	  that	  it	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  black	  people	  are	  less	  intelligent	  (2001,	  105-­‐7).	  	  .	  	  But	  though	  this	  argument	  is	  plausible	  enough,	  it	  is	  only	  one	  consideration	  among	  many	  that	  need	  to	  be	  balanced.	  As	  Kitcher	  regretfully	  notes,	  this	  argument	  may	  well	  apply	  as	  much	  to	  removal	  of	  public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  role	  of	  values	  in	  science	  has	  been	  quite	  widely	  discussed	  in	  recent	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Douglas	  (2009);	  Kincaid,	  Dupré,	  and	  Wylie	  (2007).	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funding	  as	  to	  an	  outright	  ban.	  	  My	  suggestion	  here	  is	  just	  that	  a	  democratic	  process	  that	  effectively,	  and	  without	  overwhelming	  negative	  consequences,	  	  decided	  that	  research	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  should	  not,	  for	  ethical	  reasons,	  be	  publicly	  supported,	  might	  very	  well	  have	  equally	  good	  grounds	  for	  saying	  that	  it	  should	  be	  altogether	  proscribed.	  	  	  	  
Democratic	  Science:	  What	  is	  to	  be	  done?	  	  	  As	  I	  mentioned	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  essay,	  the	  most	  important	  symptom	  of	  an	  ill-­‐ordered	  science	  is	  the	  failure	  to	  employ	  science	  to	  improve	  individual	  lives	  and	  social	  policy.	  	  Often	  the	  relevant	  boundaries	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  social	  here	  are	  open	  to	  debate.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  vaccination	  it	  is	  widely	  understood	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  case	  for	  individual	  choice	  what	  medical	  technologies	  people	  choose	  to	  employ	  for	  themselves	  or	  their	  children.	  	  Yet	  vaccination	  is	  only	  the	  most	  obvious	  technology	  that	  problematizes	  such	  a	  view.	  	  Many	  people	  deciding	  not	  to	  treat	  their	  children	  with	  the	  MMR	  vaccine	  is	  already	  causing	  serious	  health	  risks	  not	  only	  to	  themselves	  but	  to	  others.	  	  One	  solution	  would	  be	  for	  states	  to	  enforce	  mandatory	  vaccination.	  	  But	  while	  this	  may	  be	  justifiable	  in	  the	  end,	  it	  would	  seem	  much	  preferable	  if	  people	  were	  able	  to	  understand	  and	  respond	  to	  sound	  scientific	  information	  so	  as	  to	  take	  sensible	  precautionary	  health	  measures	  without	  coercion.	  	  To	  do	  this	  they	  must	  have	  either	  the	  ability	  to	  assess	  for	  themselves	  the	  value	  of	  scientific	  research	  or	  have	  a	  high	  level	  of	  trust	  in	  scientific	  experts.	  	  But	  the	  first	  option	  seems	  unrealistic	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  and	  the	  second	  seems	  both	  frequently	  absent	  and	  anyhow	  problematic	  in	  various	  ways.	  	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  problem	  Kitcher	  addresses	  in	  most	  detail	  in	  the	  second	  of	  the	  books	  under	  discussion	  here,	  Science	  in	  a	  
Democratic	  Society.	  	  What	  is	  the	  proper	  relation	  between	  democracy	  and	  expertise?	  	  Kitcher	  approaches	  the	  problem	  through	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘the	  division	  of	  cognitive	  labour’.	  	  Various	  people,	  including	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  have	  been	  described	  as	  the	  last	  person	  to	  know	  everything	  worth	  knowing,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  that	  is	  a	  feat	  far	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  anyone	  currently	  living.	  	  PubMed,	  an	  index	  of	  biomedical	  publications	  contains	  almost	  24	  million	  citations	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  and	  a	  new	  one	  is	  added	  about	  every	  minute.	  	  Even	  if	  95%	  of	  these	  have	  nothing	  very	  interesting	  to	  say,	  this	  still	  leaves	  a	  million	  or	  so	  worth	  reading,	  and	  this	  is	  just	  one	  major	  area	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  	  Hundreds	  of	  other	  databases	  can	  be	  found	  listing	  tens	  or	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  resources	  on	  topics	  from	  Japanese	  history	  to	  gardening,	  from	  astrophysics	  to	  philosophy	  (PhilPapers	  now	  lists	  over	  one	  million	  books	  and	  articles).	  	  Of	  course	  only	  a	  fraction	  of	  all	  this	  should	  probably	  count	  as	  ‘worth	  knowing’,	  but	  then	  the	  problem	  is	  to	  find	  out	  what	  fraction.	  	  The	  only	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  a	  division	  of	  cognitive	  labour:	  for	  many	  different	  areas	  of	  knowledge	  there	  are	  some	  people	  who	  know	  a	  good	  deal	  about	  what	  is	  known	  or	  credibly	  believed;	  these	  are	  the	  experts.	  If	  we	  need	  to	  know	  something	  about	  an	  area	  on	  which	  we	  are	  not	  an	  expert,	  rather	  than	  dive	  into	  this	  ocean	  of	  more	  or	  less	  reliable	  verbiage,	  we	  find	  an	  expert.	  	  	  	  So	  far,	  so	  good.	  	  Now	  return	  to	  the	  central	  questions	  for	  political	  philosophy	  of	  science:	  how	  do	  we	  decide	  what	  science	  should	  be	  done,	  or	  at	  least	  funded,	  and	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how	  do	  we	  apply	  science	  to	  real	  practical	  problems?	  	  Two	  problems	  arise.	  	  First,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  consensus	  that	  decisions	  on	  public	  policy	  should	  be	  to	  some	  extent	  democratic.	  	  Placing	  decisions	  wholly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  an	  elite	  caste,	  whether	  they	  be	  politicians,	  philosopher	  kings,	  priests	  or	  scientific	  experts,	  notoriously	  leads	  to	  abuse	  and	  oppression.	  	  But,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  democracy	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  sometimes	  to	  policies	  that	  scientific	  evidence	  suggests	  will	  be	  disastrous.	  	  Second,	  there	  are	  areas	  in	  which,	  arguably,	  no	  expertise	  exists.	  	  I	  have	  already	  suggested	  that	  there	  are	  no	  scientific	  experts	  on	  which	  science	  should	  be	  supported,	  as	  all	  scientists,	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  cognitive	  specialisation	  that	  is	  their	  job,	  are	  bound	  to	  be	  biased	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  And	  Kitcher	  adds	  an	  additional	  interesting	  if	  controversial	  claim,	  that	  there	  are	  no	  experts	  in	  ethics	  (2011b,	  286).	  	  If	  ethics	  is	  a	  technology	  for	  promoting	  altruism	  and	  social	  consensus,	  there	  can	  perhaps	  be	  facilitators	  of	  this	  process,	  but	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  citizenry	  at	  large	  to	  reach	  their	  agreements.	  	  	  How,	  then	  do	  we	  steer	  between	  the	  Scylla	  of	  epistemic	  equality	  and	  the	  Charybdis	  of	  Platonic	  authoritarianism	  in	  making	  these	  judgements	  about	  the	  content	  and	  application	  of	  science?	  	  Since	  these	  are,	  of	  course,	  normative	  questions,	  it	  will	  be	  relevant	  to	  mention	  Kitcher’s	  (2011b)	  account	  of	  ethics.	  	  Ethics	  is,	  for	  him,	  a	  social	  technology.	  	  One	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  convinced	  by	  the	  evolutionary	  story	  that	  Kitcher	  tells	  about	  the	  emergence	  of	  technology	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  social	  coordination	  problems	  faced	  by	  early	  humans,	  but	  the	  conclusion	  the	  basic	  idea	  to	  which	  this	  leads,	  that	  ethics	  is	  constituted	  by	  a	  set	  of	  social	  practices	  and	  institutions	  to	  regulate	  behaviour	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  social	  harmony	  seems	  compelling.	  	  	  	  Implicit	  in	  Kitcher’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  present	  issue	  is	  his	  treatment	  of	  science	  and	  democracy	  as	  social	  technologies	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  ethics	  (see	  D’Agostino	  2013).	  	  This	  perspective	  provides	  surely	  the	  right	  perspective	  on	  the	  questions	  under	  consideration,	  though	  it	  is	  important	  at	  least	  to	  gesture	  at	  the	  substantial	  and	  complex	  bodies	  of	  academic	  work	  that	  have	  attempted	  to	  disclose	  the	  workings	  of	  both	  of	  these	  institutions.	  	  Democracy,	  very	  crudely,	  is	  a	  technology	  for	  pubic	  decision-­‐making,	  which,	  more	  or	  less	  aims	  to	  reflect	  the	  views	  of	  citizens,	  or	  the	  majority	  of	  citizens	  in	  decisions	  about	  public	  policy.	  	  As	  a	  	  technology,	  it	  is	  constituted	  by	  procedures	  such	  as	  voting,	  parliamentary	  government,	  referenda	  and,	  importantly,	  various	  more	  informal	  channels	  through	  which	  citizens	  come	  to	  express	  their	  views	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  become	  known	  to	  politicians	  and	  influence	  their	  behaviour.	  	  I	  emphasise	  this	  last	  feature,	  because	  it	  is	  arguably	  the	  quite	  recent	  proliferation	  of	  channels	  of	  communication,	  notably	  through	  the	  internet,	  that	  has	  brought	  this	  clash	  between	  democracy	  and	  science	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  Citizens	  today	  have	  access	  to	  quantities	  of	  information	  inconceivable	  a	  few	  decades	  ago,	  though	  perhaps	  not	  accompanied	  by	  comparably	  effective	  tools	  for	  assessing	  its	  quality.	  	  They	  also	  have	  multiple	  means	  of	  expressing	  their	  opinions,	  through	  blogs,	  social	  media,	  email	  petitions,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  	  Science	  as	  a	  social	  technology	  has	  been	  studied	  intensively	  by	  sociologists	  and	  by	  scholars	  in	  Science,	  Technology	  and	  Society	  (STS).	  	  Important	  elements	  include	  university	  departments,	  laboratories,	  training	  programmes,	  academic	  journals,	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and	  hierarchies	  of	  power	  and	  authority.	  	  It	  is	  a	  technology	  of	  knowledge	  production,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  production	  of	  practical	  technologies	  for	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  human	  needs	  and	  wants	  and	  for	  interacting	  with	  the	  world.	  	  It	  is	  also	  the	  home	  of	  expertise,	  of	  people	  taken	  to	  be	  qualified	  to	  provide	  authoritative	  opinions	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  these	  institutions	  can	  come	  into	  conflict	  in	  the	  context	  of	  public	  policy	  decisions.	  	  Consider,	  for	  instance,	  the	  debate	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  Europe	  on	  Genetically	  Modified	  (GM)	  foods.	  	  Emerging	  from	  a	  remarkable	  explosion	  of	  knowledge	  of,	  and	  technical	  capacity	  in	  interaction	  with,	  genomes,	  these	  were	  developed	  as	  products	  intended	  to	  meet	  human	  needs	  for	  food3.	  	  Within	  the	  scientific	  community	  they	  were	  widely	  agreed	  to	  be	  an	  excellent	  pathway	  to	  produce	  many	  desirable	  characteristics	  of	  crops—reduced	  competition	  from	  weeds,	  resistance	  to	  insect	  attack,	  extra	  nutrients,	  and	  so	  on—and	  hence	  to	  a	  more	  efficient	  and	  productive	  agriculture.	  	  Though	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  due	  diligence	  was	  seen	  as	  necessary	  as	  in	  any	  major	  modification	  of	  the	  human	  food	  chain,	  scientists	  generally	  saw	  little	  reason	  to	  anticipate	  serious	  risks	  to	  health,	  and	  claimed	  possible	  benefits	  for	  the	  environment,	  including	  reduced	  needs	  for	  herbicides	  and	  pesticides.	  	  Public	  reaction	  was	  another	  matter.	  	  Under	  the	  inspired	  label	  of	  ‘Frankenfoods’,	  GM	  crops	  were	  widely	  portrayed	  as	  a	  God-­‐like	  interference	  with	  the	  natural	  order,	  likely	  to	  involve	  unacceptable	  threats	  to	  human	  health	  and	  to	  the	  environment.	  	  This	  perspective	  seemed	  quite	  unaffected	  by	  declarations	  by	  scientific	  experts	  that	  such	  fears	  were	  groundless,	  and	  political	  pressure	  driven	  by	  the	  strength	  of	  public	  hostility	  led	  to	  the	  large	  scale	  abandonment	  of	  the	  technology.	  	  In	  some	  sense	  this	  must	  presumably	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  success	  for	  democracy:	  the	  public	  on	  balance	  rejected	  this	  technology,	  and	  the	  democratic	  government	  responded	  to	  their	  preferences.	  	  This	  appears	  also,	  however,	  to	  be	  a	  departure	  from	  well-­‐ordered	  science.	  	  Assuming	  the	  experts	  are	  right—and	  there	  seems	  little	  compelling	  reason	  to	  doubt	  it	  in	  this	  case—an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  valuable	  technology,	  not	  to	  mention	  a	  leading	  position	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  technology	  as	  an	  internationally	  marketable	  commodity,	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  passed	  up.	  	  Why	  did	  the	  UK	  public,	  and	  publics	  in	  much	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe,	  take	  so	  strongly	  against	  this	  technology?	  	  The	  story	  is,	  unsurprisingly	  very	  complex,	  involving	  a	  variety	  of	  interests	  and	  arguments.4	  There	  is	  a	  history	  that	  goes	  some	  way	  to	  explain	  the	  background	  of	  public	  suspicion	  of	  scientists,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  UK	  the	  then	  recent	  fiasco	  over	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Bovine	  Spongiform	  Encephelopathy	  (BSE,	  or	  ‘mad	  cow	  disease’)	  outbreak,	  in	  which	  scientists	  had	  informed	  the	  government	  there	  was	  no	  risk	  to	  public	  health,	  something	  that	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  false.	  	  There	  was	  widespread	  and	  understandable	  suspicion	  of	  the	  motives	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  They	  were	  also,	  of	  course	  technologies	  intended	  for	  the	  enrichment	  of	  corporations	  and	  their	  shareholders,	  a	  factor	  that	  no	  doubt	  played	  some	  part	  in	  generating	  the	  public	  suspicion	  directed	  towards	  them.	  4	  Much	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  these	  arguments	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Barnes	  and	  Dupré	  2008,	  chs.	  6	  and	  7.	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corporations,	  notably	  Monsanto,	  who	  were	  major	  funders	  of	  GM	  research.	  	  It	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  this	  outcome	  was	  highly	  contingent,	  as	  no	  comparable	  public	  opposition	  emerged	  to	  GM	  technology	  in	  the	  US,	  where	  millions	  of	  acres	  of	  GM	  corn	  and	  other	  crops	  are	  cultivated	  without	  anyone	  being	  much	  concerned.	  	  	  	  A	  disturbing	  issue	  raised	  by	  this	  case	  for	  well-­‐ordered	  science	  is	  the	  question	  how	  informed	  public	  perceptions	  of	  science	  are	  even	  possible	  given	  the	  communications	  revolution	  alluded	  to	  above.	  	  Consider,	  for	  instance,	  the	  averagely	  well-­‐educated	  reader	  of	  a	  news	  story	  about	  the	  bacterium,	  Klebsiella	  
Planticola.	  	  According	  to	  a	  story	  that	  circulated	  widely	  a	  few	  years	  ago	  this	  was	  an	  organism	  that	  had	  been	  genetically	  modified	  in	  the	  1990s	  with	  the	  perhaps	  excellent	  intention	  of	  helping	  to	  turn	  plant	  waste	  into	  alcohol—this	  at	  a	  time	  when	  growing	  motor	  fuel	  in	  fields	  still	  seemed	  a	  plausibly	  good	  idea.	  According	  to	  the	  story,	  however,	  a	  heroic	  amateur	  scientist,	  Elaine	  Ingham,	  had	  discovered	  that	  this	  organism	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  provide	  a	  film	  over	  the	  roots	  of	  plants	  that	  would	  generate	  a	  lethal	  dose	  of	  ethanol.	  	  Potentially,	  the	  story	  went,	  this	  could	  potentially	  wipe	  out	  plant	  life	  across	  the	  planet,	  and	  we	  would	  of	  course	  follow	  soon	  enough.	  	  If	  the	  reader	  were	  concerned	  whether	  there	  might	  be	  environmental	  risks	  to	  genetic	  modification	  of	  organisms	  this	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  compelling	  evidence	  for	  a	  pessimistic	  conclusion.	  	  About	  ten	  years	  I	  encountered	  this	  story	  and	  looked	  up	  ‘Klebsiella	  Planticola’	  on	  Google.	  	  Hundreds	  of	  websites	  reported	  this	  horrifying	  brush	  with	  disaster,	  and	  none	  that	  I	  could	  find	  raised	  any	  doubts	  about	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  research.	  I	  Indeed	  it	  is	  still	  widely	  cited	  today	  in	  support	  of	  the	  alleged	  riskiness	  of	  genetic	  modification.	  	  Repeating	  this	  search	  today	  (May	  14,	  2014),	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  hits	  still	  report	  this	  result,	  often	  with	  headlines	  such	  as	  ‘The	  Bacterium	  that	  Nearly	  Ate	  the	  World’.	  	  However	  there	  are	  also	  a	  few	  blogs	  that	  report	  the	  discrediting	  of	  the	  research.	  	  With	  some	  perseverance	  a	  source	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  impressive	  to	  the	  scientific	  reader	  than	  a	  blog	  of	  unknown	  provenance,	  
Nature	  Biotechnology	  (Fletcher	  2001),	  reports	  that	  Ingham	  has	  subsequently	  apologized	  to	  the	  New	  Zealand	  government	  for	  submitting	  false	  claims	  about	  the	  ecological	  impact	  of	  genetically	  modified	  organisms,	  claims	  that	  were	  backed	  up	  by	  a	  scientific	  reference	  that	  didn’t	  in	  fact	  exist.	  	  Note,	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  a	  resource	  behind	  a	  paywall	  that	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  passable	  by	  the	  non-­‐academic	  reader.	  	  	  	  In	  fact,	  moreover,	  the	  modification	  that	  caused	  this	  furore	  is	  the	  copy	  multiplication	  of	  a	  gene	  present	  in	  wild	  strains	  of	  this	  organism,	  and	  general	  reflection	  on	  microbial	  evolution	  suggests	  that	  if	  it	  were	  useful	  for	  the	  organism	  to	  duplicate	  this	  gene	  it	  would	  probably	  have	  done	  so.	  	  Killing	  the	  organisms	  with	  which	  it	  associates—all	  or	  most	  plants—probably	  would	  not	  be	  a	  selectively	  advantageous	  strategy,	  and	  the	  extrapolation	  from	  the	  ability	  of	  this	  modified	  bacterium	  to	  kill	  a	  plant	  in	  a	  confined	  environment	  in	  a	  laboratory	  to	  its	  likely	  spread	  across	  the	  planet	  is,	  to	  put	  it	  politely,	  biologically	  unlikely.	  	  But,	  and	  this	  is	  my	  main	  point,	  to	  the	  reader	  with	  limited	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  limited	  access	  to	  scientific	  resources	  (should	  he	  or	  she	  even	  think	  of	  looking	  for	  them)	  the	  conclusion	  that	  GM	  technology	  had	  almost	  wiped	  out	  life	  on	  Earth	  might	  seem	  a	  reasonable	  one.	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  Parallels	  with	  the	  case	  of	  the	  MMR	  vaccine	  are	  obvious.	  	  The	  notorious	  paper	  by	  Andrew	  Wakefield	  (Wakefiel	  et	  al.	  1998)	  has	  been	  fully	  discredited	  in	  the	  scientific	  community,	  disowned	  by	  Wakefield’s	  collaborators,	  and	  withdrawn	  by	  the	  Lancet.	  	  Dr	  Wakefield	  has	  been	  struck	  off	  the	  medical	  register	  by	  the	  British	  Medical	  Council.	  	  Yet	  again,	  consulting	  Google	  on	  this	  topic	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  wider	  public	  a	  debate	  still	  rages.	  	  Wakefield	  is	  said	  by	  many	  to	  have	  been	  smeared	  by	  the	  medical	  establishment,	  certainly	  one	  possible	  interpretation	  of	  what	  has	  happened	  to	  him.	  	  A	  particularly	  telling	  comment	  in	  the	  internet	  discussion	  is	  the	  following:	  “why	  don't	  you	  let	  parents	  just	  make	  their	  own	  decisions?	  Do	  your	  research	  and	  make	  whatever	  decisions	  you	  think	  are	  best	  for	  your	  OWN	  children.	  Isn't	  that	  the	  very	  essences	  of	  parenting?”	  	  This	  seems	  well	  to	  reflect	  the	  reality	  in	  which	  many	  parents	  in	  fact	  decide	  not	  to	  vaccinate	  their	  children,	  and	  the	  consequent	  rising	  incidence	  of	  disease.	  	  	  	  
Kitcher’s	  Solutions	  	  In	  the	  previous	  section	  I	  portrayed	  the	  current	  much	  discussed	  flood	  of	  information	  as	  presenting	  a	  problem	  for	  anyone,	  except	  perhaps	  the	  relevant	  expert,	  in	  deciding	  what	  to	  believe.	  	  One	  aspect	  of	  the	  well-­‐ordered	  science	  that	  Kitcher	  advocates	  in	  Science	  in	  a	  Democratic	  Society	  is	  a	  public	  institution	  of	  ‘certification’	  through	  which	  established	  results	  get	  into	  the	  ‘repository’	  of	  socially	  accepted	  knowledge.	  	  Clearly	  Kitcher	  would	  like	  to	  see	  the	  consensus	  of	  climate	  scientists	  on	  global	  warming,	  of	  biologists	  on	  safe	  ways	  of	  improving	  crops,	  our	  best	  evolutionary	  theory	  and	  so	  on,	  certified	  for	  the	  repository,	  and	  the	  views	  of	  climate	  change	  deniers,	  GM	  scaremongers,	  or	  intelligent	  design	  theorists	  excluded.	  	  I	  agree	  with	  him.	  	  But	  how	  is	  this	  to	  be	  done	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  democratic	  and	  broadly	  acceptable	  to	  a	  democratic	  citizenry?	  	  Reflection	  on	  the	  broad	  (democratic?)	  discussion	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  internet	  are	  not	  altogether	  encouraging.	  	  Kitcher	  does	  not	  endorse	  a	  naïve	  or	  ‘vulgar’	  democracy.	  	  Certainly	  decisions	  on	  scientific	  matters—what	  science	  is	  to	  be	  funded,	  what	  results	  are	  to	  be	  certified,	  and	  how	  they	  should	  be	  applied—are	  not	  to	  be	  decided	  by	  referendum.	  	  Kitcher	  does	  base	  his	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  on	  discussion	  and	  deliberation,	  but	  not	  of	  the	  anarchic	  kind	  that	  the	  internet	  represents.	  	  What	  is	  wrong	  with	  vulgar	  democracy?	  	  One	  problem	  is	  the	  venality	  of	  some	  participants.	  	  ‘Resisters’—climate	  change	  sceptics,	  intelligent	  design	  theorists,	  and	  so	  on—who	  oppose	  rationally	  indisputable	  scientific	  results	  are	  in	  fact	  operating	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  different,	  and	  generally	  concealed,	  values.	  	  Climate	  science	  deniers	  are	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry;	  scientists	  arguing	  for	  the	  safety	  of	  cigarettes	  were	  frequently	  found	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  tobacco	  industry.	  	  The	  proper	  kind	  of	  transparent	  discussion	  will	  reveal	  these	  values,	  and	  the	  democratic	  majority	  at	  least	  will	  find	  that	  they	  do	  not	  share	  them.	  	  It	  is	  not	  that	  the	  competent	  scientists	  do	  not	  have	  values	  of	  their	  own,	  but	  generally	  these	  will	  be	  values	  that,	  again	  with	  proper	  explanation	  and	  transparency,	  the	  citizenry	  will	  endorse.	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Kitcher	  actually	  has	  two	  very	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  relevant	  conversation.	  	  The	  one	  that	  ultimately	  drives	  the	  argument	  is	  a	  Rawlsian	  one,	  a	  conversation	  of	  ideal	  deliberators	  who	  aim	  to	  reach	  consensus	  in	  a	  reflective	  equilibrium.	  	  This,	  it	  is	  supposed,	  will	  eliminate	  values	  that	  are	  not	  sustainable	  in	  such	  an	  ideal	  conversation.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Kitcher	  describes	  actual	  conversations	  between	  experts	  and	  representative	  lay	  participants,	  the	  latter	  to	  be	  thoroughly	  briefed	  by	  the	  former,	  so	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  reach	  informed	  decisions	  subsuming	  sustainable	  values.	  	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  while	  the	  former	  conception	  appears	  to	  offer	  a	  criterion	  for	  what	  the	  normatively	  correct	  (ideal)	  outcome	  should	  be,	  this	  needs	  to	  be	  reconciled	  with	  a	  naturalistic	  account	  of	  ethics	  as	  an	  actual	  social	  technology	  that	  evolved	  from	  actual	  discussions	  between	  agents	  concerned	  to	  resolve	  social	  discord.	  	  It	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  these	  two	  conceptions	  are	  to	  be	  harmonised.	  	  A	  somewhat	  cynical	  view	  is	  that	  “the	  notion	  of	  ‘‘ideal	  deliberators’’	  often	  seems	  like	  little	  more	  than	  a	  philosophical	  delivery	  van	  for	  Kitcher’s	  policy	  proposals”	  (Brown	  2013,	  395).	  	  Slightly	  less	  cynically,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  what	  would	  make	  a	  deliberator	  ideal	  if,	  as	  Kitcher	  insists,	  there	  are	  no	  ethical	  experts.	  	  Not	  cynically	  at	  all,	  while	  I	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  sympathy	  for	  the	  model	  of	  an	  ideal	  conversation	  as	  an	  intellectual	  tool,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  somewhat	  tangential	  to	  the	  most	  interesting	  feature	  of	  Kitcher’s	  work	  in	  this	  area,	  which	  is	  the	  aim	  of	  understanding	  and	  addressing	  the	  discordance	  between	  two	  social	  technologies	  that	  Kitcher,	  and	  I	  expect	  most	  of	  his	  readers,	  admire,	  science	  and	  democracy.	  	  For	  this,	  surely,	  is	  a	  technological	  problem,	  largely	  independent	  of	  any	  theoretical,	  meta-­‐ethical	  account	  of	  what	  would	  be	  the	  normatively	  desirable	  outcome	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  science.	  	  This	  may	  seem	  wrong	  for	  the	  following	  reason.	  	  Surely	  we	  need	  some	  explanation	  of	  why	  we	  thought	  science	  was	  disordered	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  doesn’t	  this	  require	  an	  account	  of	  value	  against	  which	  the	  present	  situation	  can	  be	  judged	  wanting?	  	  I	  think	  that	  this	  worry	  does	  point	  to	  a	  real	  tension	  in	  Kitcher’s	  writing.	  	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  his	  concerns	  do	  begin	  with	  some	  firm	  convictions	  that	  things	  are	  amiss,	  for	  example	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  democratic	  states	  to	  adopt	  serious	  measures	  to	  combat	  climate	  change.	  	  And	  I	  don’t	  doubt	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  this.	  	  Personally	  I	  am	  more	  persuaded	  by	  formulations	  of	  these	  reasons	  in	  terms	  of	  evidence	  and	  consequences	  than	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  views	  that	  would	  be	  reached	  by	  ideal	  deliberators,	  though	  of	  course	  Kitcher	  aims	  to	  do	  both,	  and	  the	  formulations	  do	  answer	  different	  questions.	  	  And	  of	  course	  both	  evidence	  and	  consequences	  involve	  normative	  assumptions.	  	  But	  surely	  if	  one	  is	  serious	  about	  democracy,	  even	  a	  sophisticated	  democracy	  free	  of	  all	  the	  familiar	  forms	  of	  vulgarity,	  one	  cannot	  prejudge	  the	  question	  what	  any	  suitable	  democratic	  process	  will	  decide	  about	  any	  positional	  policy	  issue.	  	  Kitcher	  is	  an	  optimist,	  and	  he	  tends	  to	  believe	  that	  a	  proper,	  non-­‐vulgar	  democratic	  system	  will	  produce	  decisions	  more	  or	  less	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  sensible	  people	  like	  he	  or	  I	  would	  prefer.	  	  But	  it	  surely	  conceivable	  that	  a	  democratic	  society	  might	  reach	  a	  fully	  articulated	  view	  that	  without	  major	  changes	  in	  consumption	  patterns	  the	  world	  would	  be	  uninhabitable	  in	  two	  hundred	  years	  time,	  that	  Bangladesh	  would	  be	  under	  water	  in	  a	  hundred,	  and	  so	  on,	  and	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democratically	  agree	  that	  they	  would	  rather	  keep	  their	  gas-­‐guzzling	  cars	  and	  air-­‐conditioned	  homes.	  	  One	  may	  conclude,	  so	  much	  the	  worse	  for	  our	  descendants	  and	  the	  Bangladeshis,	  or	  so	  much	  the	  worse	  for	  democracy,	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  the	  problem	  can	  be	  solved	  by	  yoking	  democracy	  to	  a	  theoretical	  account	  of	  what	  should	  be	  done.	  It	  might	  be,	  of	  course,	  that	  there	  are	  ethical	  experts	  after	  all,	  and	  Kitcher	  is	  one	  of	  them.	  	  But	  in	  that	  case	  shouldn’t	  we	  try	  to	  devolve	  our	  decisions	  to	  Kitcher	  and	  his	  likes	  rather	  than	  to	  an	  unreliable	  democratic	  process?	  	  So	  this	  brings	  me	  to	  the	  more	  practical	  kind	  of	  discussion	  that	  Kitcher	  considers.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  practical	  resolution	  between	  democratic	  and	  expert	  opinion	  is	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  something	  like	  citizens’	  juries,	  including	  both	  a	  range	  of	  relevant	  experts	  and	  representatives	  of	  the	  public,	  the	  latter	  selected	  to	  cover	  as	  wide	  a	  range	  as	  possible	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  perspectives	  within	  a	  population,	  and	  especially	  representing	  groups	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  decisions	  being	  taken.	  	  The	  problems	  of	  vulgar	  democracy	  will	  be	  addressed	  by	  making	  sure	  that	  all	  the	  facts	  as	  seen	  by	  experts	  are	  presented,	  and	  time	  has	  been	  allowed	  to	  raise	  all	  questions	  or	  doubts	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  lay	  members	  of	  the	  panel.	  	  If	  all	  goes	  right,	  first	  the	  panel	  will	  reach	  some	  consensus	  on	  the	  matter	  at	  hand,	  and	  second	  the	  process	  will	  have	  sufficient	  general	  legitimacy	  that	  its	  decisions	  will	  command	  widespread	  respect.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  say	  that	  this	  is	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  solution:	  it	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  mesh	  the	  two	  conflicting	  social	  technologies	  in	  a	  way	  that	  will	  reconcile	  their	  conflicts.	  	  But	  I	  must	  confess	  to	  being	  a	  bit	  sceptical	  as	  to	  whether	  such	  a	  system	  is	  likely	  to	  achieve	  the	  benefits	  Kitcher	  hopes	  for.	  	  Will	  the	  fundamentalists,	  racists,	  climate	  change	  deniers,	  Christian	  scientists,	  alien	  abductees,	  and	  so	  on	  have	  a	  privileged	  place	  at	  the	  table	  as	  groups	  likely	  to	  be	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  reasonable	  consensus	  of	  these	  committees?	  Will	  they	  be	  convinced?	  Even	  if	  they	  are	  convinced,	  will	  they	  not	  be	  perceived	  as	  traitors	  by	  their	  wider	  communities?	  More	  generally,	  will	  these	  committees	  be	  perceived	  as	  genuinely	  democratic,	  or	  merely	  as	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  scientifically	  minded	  to	  generate	  propaganda	  for	  their	  views	  with	  the	  help	  of	  ambitious	  stooges	  from	  the	  wider	  public?	  	  Given	  the	  experience	  that	  many	  people	  are	  happy	  to	  draw	  their	  opinions	  from	  sources	  wholly	  opposed	  to	  almost	  universal	  scientific	  consensus,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  know	  why	  they	  should	  change	  their	  views	  in	  the	  face	  of	  even	  the	  most	  well-­‐meaning	  Quango.5	  	  All	  this	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  groups	  of	  this	  kind	  can	  be	  a	  good	  idea.	  	  Indeed	  they	  are	  demonstrably	  so.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  quangos,	  the	  UK	  Human	  Fertilisation	  and	  Embryology	  Authority	  (HFEA),	  which	  regulates	  research	  involving	  human	  gametes	  and	  embryos,	  is	  a	  very	  widely	  respected	  group,	  in	  many	  respects	  very	  much	  the	  kind	  of	  entity	  Kitcher	  advocates.6	  	  This	  body	  includes	  scientists,	  doctors,	  women	  who	  have	  experienced	  fertility	  treatments,	  a	  bishop,	  a	  lawyer,	  and	  even	  a	  philosopher.	  	  Unfortunately,	  its	  decisions	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  change	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A	  quango,	  in	  the	  UK,	  is	  a	  quasi	  non-­‐governmental	  organization.	  	  6	  Sufficiently	  well-­‐respected	  that	  it	  survived	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘bonfire	  of	  the	  quangos’	  in	  which	  the	  Cameron	  administration	  attempted	  to	  dispose	  of	  as	  many	  as	  possible	  of	  such	  bodies.	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minds	  of	  those	  who	  oppose	  them.	  	  For	  example	  when	  the	  HFEA	  first	  licensed	  therapeutic	  human	  cloning	  in	  2004,	  there	  was	  outrage	  from	  a	  range	  of	  ‘Pro-­‐Life’	  groups.	  	  Perhaps	  most	  telling	  was	  the	  comment	  attributed	  to	  Josephine	  Quintavalle,	  of	  the	  pro-­‐life	  group	  Comment	  On	  Reproductive	  Ethics:	  "It	  is	  very	  worrying	  indeed.	  We	  have	  decisions	  of	  this	  magnitude	  being	  taken	  by	  an	  unelected	  government	  quango".7	  	  The	  absence	  of	  vulgar	  democracy	  may	  be	  used	  as	  a	  weapon.	  I	  have	  mentioned	  that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  problem	  in	  harmonising	  the	  ideal	  and	  practical	  conceptions	  of	  conversation.	  	  This	  is	  most	  obvious	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  are	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  Recall	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  social	  technology	  that	  is	  the	  model	  for	  addressing	  ill-­‐ordered	  science,	  the	  ethical	  project,	  is	  taken	  to	  have	  originated	  in	  discussions	  within	  small	  proto-­‐human	  tribes.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  climate	  change,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  global.	  	  The	  possibility	  of	  small	  groups	  sitting	  round	  a	  table	  to	  hammer	  out	  a	  relatively	  local	  problem	  is	  appealing,	  perhaps	  even	  the	  adult	  male	  citizenry	  of	  a	  Greek	  polis	  might	  gather	  in	  the	  agora	  to	  similar	  effect.	  	  Representation	  of	  all	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  Earth,	  and	  all	  the	  different	  perspectives	  within	  each	  nation,	  is	  a	  different	  matter,	  and	  perhaps	  only	  accessible	  to	  the	  ideal	  conversation.	  	  One	  trouble	  with	  the	  ideal	  conversation	  when	  it	  is	  more	  than	  some	  kind	  of	  rationalisation	  of	  a	  practical	  process	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  suspiciously	  like	  a	  job	  for	  an	  expert	  ethicist	  of	  whom,	  Kitcher	  has	  told	  us,	  there	  are	  none.	  	  The	  difficulties	  with	  a	  conversation	  over	  climate	  change	  do	  not	  end	  here.	  	  Those	  most	  affected,	  on	  all	  but	  the	  most	  pessimistic	  scenarios,	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  born.	  	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  many	  possible	  people	  who	  will	  not	  be	  born	  unless	  we	  do	  something	  serious	  to	  address	  this	  problem.	  	  Who	  will	  speak	  for	  the	  unborn	  or	  the	  possibly	  never	  to	  be	  born?	  	  Kitcher	  thinks	  that	  among	  peoples’	  central	  life	  goals	  are	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  their	  children,	  grandchildren	  and,	  perhaps	  by	  extension,	  future	  generations	  generally.	  	  I’m	  not	  sure.	  	  I	  think	  most	  people	  care	  a	  lot	  about	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  their	  children	  and	  many,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  all,	  care	  about	  their	  grandchildren.	  	  But	  future	  generations	  long	  after	  their	  own	  deaths?	  	  I’m	  much	  less	  sure.	  	  Perhaps	  again	  they	  will	  need	  experts	  on	  ethics	  to	  speak	  on	  their	  behalf.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  I	  have	  been	  somewhat	  sceptical	  about	  the	  proposals	  Kitcher	  sketches	  for	  reconciling	  science	  and	  democracy.	  He	  is,	  I	  have	  said,	  an	  optimist,	  and	  in	  this	  domain	  I	  am	  more	  pessimistic.	  	  Kitcher	  thinks	  that	  scientists	  discredit	  themselves	  by	  making	  excessive	  claims	  for	  their	  expertise	  and	  by	  acting	  on	  values	  other	  than	  those	  that	  should	  legitimately	  underlie	  their	  professional	  work.	  	  If	  institutions	  could	  be	  constructed	  that	  would	  expose	  these	  flaws	  and	  open	  their	  work	  to	  rational	  and	  civilised	  discussion,	  these	  flaws	  could	  be	  removed	  and	  well-­‐ordered	  science	  would	  regain	  the	  deserved	  trust	  of	  the	  citizenry.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3554474.stm.	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I	  fear	  that	  the	  sources	  of	  these	  defects	  go	  deeper,	  and	  that	  they	  will	  be	  even	  harder	  to	  remove	  than	  Kitcher	  supposes.	  	  I	  have	  described	  Kitcher’s	  project	  as	  a	  political	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  and	  I	  wholeheartedly	  agree	  that	  that	  is	  something	  we	  need.	  	  The	  politics,	  however,	  is	  largely	  limited	  to	  the	  commitment	  to	  an	  admittedly	  sophisticated	  conception	  of	  democracy.	  	  This	  is,	  no	  doubt,	  a	  good	  thing	  to	  be	  committed	  to.	  	  But	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  Kitcher	  is	  concerned	  with	  arise	  not	  merely	  from	  failures	  of	  democracy,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  intrinsic	  problems	  with	  the	  liberal,	  or	  neoliberal,	  framework	  within	  which	  most	  current	  democracies	  exist.	  	  In	  a	  social	  system	  that	  forefronts	  competition	  between	  individuals	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  scientists	  who	  don’t	  have	  their	  own	  agendas,	  even	  if	  these	  are	  no	  worse	  than	  the	  quest	  for	  personal	  success	  by	  doing	  good	  science.	  	  More	  problematically,	  a	  system	  that	  encourages	  the	  accumulation	  of	  wealth	  in	  large	  competitive	  corporations,	  and	  encourages	  these	  corporations	  to	  fund	  scientific	  research,	  will	  inevitably	  produce	  research	  infected	  with	  the	  values	  of	  the	  corporate	  funders.	  	  These	  are	  issues	  that,	  I	  fear,	  can	  only	  be	  addressed	  at	  a	  more	  systemic	  level	  than	  even	  the	  most	  well-­‐constructed	  institutional	  add-­‐ons	  for	  enlightened	  public	  debate.	  	  Having	  expressed	  these	  doubts,	  I	  must	  nonetheless	  reiterate	  my	  endorsement	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  Kitcher’s	  project,	  and	  the	  gratitude	  we	  should	  feel	  for	  the	  work	  he	  has	  done	  to	  open	  up	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  to	  these	  absolutely	  fundamental	  questions.	  	  The	  two	  books	  I	  have	  been	  considering	  on	  well-­‐ordered	  science,	  together	  with	  his	  account	  of	  the	  ethical	  project,	  constitute	  a	  systematic	  attempt	  to	  address	  the	  political	  question	  of	  the	  role	  of	  science	  in	  society,	  and	  his	  account	  is	  full	  of	  valuable	  insights	  that	  should	  remain	  part	  of	  this	  debate.	  	  	  	  My	  suspicion,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  construct	  a	  democratic	  science	  may	  ultimately	  be	  impossible	  without	  more	  integration	  into	  the	  problem	  of	  constructing	  a	  democratic	  society.	  In	  2012,	  the	  world's	  100	  richest	  people	  became	  $241	  billion	  richer.	  They	  are	  now	  worth	  $1.9	  trillion:	  just	  a	  little	  less	  than	  the	  entire	  output	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  8	  	  The	  problem	  that	  Kitcher	  is	  discussing	  is	  democracy	  of	  voice	  not	  equality	  of	  resources.	  	  But	  as	  resources	  become	  ever	  more	  unequal,	  democracy	  of	  voice	  becomes	  ever	  more	  unrealistic.	  	  It	  would	  be	  nice	  to	  see	  a	  democratic	  socialist	  account	  of	  well-­‐ordered	  science,	  though	  perhaps	  given	  the	  distance	  we	  are	  from	  democratic	  socialism,	  Kitcher’s	  account,	  despite	  inevitable	  weaknesses,	  will	  be	  more	  useful.	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